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Abstract: During the last years the lending business has come under considerable
competitive pressure and bank managers often express concern regarding its profitability
vis-a-vis other activities. This paper tries to empirically identify factors that are able to
explain the financial performance of bank lending activities. The analysis is based on the
CFS-data-set that has been collected in 1997 from 200 medium-sized firms. Two
regressions are performed: The first is directed towards relationships between the interest
rate premiums and various determining factors, the second aims at detecting relationships
between those factors and the occurrence of several types of problems during the course of
a credit engagement. Furthermore, the results of both regressions are used to test
theoretical hypotheses regarding the impact of certain parameters on credit terms and
distress probabilities. The findings are somewhat “puzzling“: First, the rating is not as
significant as expected. Second, credit contracts seem to be priced lower for situations with
greater risks. Finally, the results do not fully support any of three hypotheses that are often
advanced to describe the role of collateral and covenants in credit contracts.
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1. Introduction
This paper is part of a comprehensive research project on „credit policy“ intitiated by the
„Center for Financial Studies“ (CFS) of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University of
Frankfurt/M. The starting point for our part is as follows: In discussions with bankers it is
often advanced that the „traditional“ credit business has come under considerable
competitive pressure. Thus, credit margins are said to decrease and the profitability of
lending becomes doubtful. In banks with several lines of business (e.g. German universal
banks offering virtually all types of financial services), granting credit to a firm seems more
to be viewed as a „door opener“ for other transactions (e.g. investment banking activities
etc.) that are hypothesized to be more advantageous for the bank. Thus, arguments of
„cross selling“ are often deemed to be major factors in support of the lending business.
Regarding the discussion described above it is an interesting question to study the
empirical determinants of bank lending performance. Are there any empirical regularities
between several factors and measures for the „success“ of the lending business? Answering
that question could not only yield insights regarding the empirical validity of theories that
try to explain reality; it could also help practitioners seeking for alternatives to improve the
profitability of their credit transactions.
Conceptually the preferred way to measure „success“ in economic terms is looking at the
incremental cash flows resulting from a lending contract. Thus, in order to detect any
relations between determining factors and cash-flow-based success indicators, the following
procedure seems to be suitable: First, the cash flows that really occurred from a sample of
credit contracts could be represented by a single indicator for each respective element, e.g.
the internal rate of return. Then the internal rates of return for the sample could be
regressed on various factors that are hypothesized to impact on the cash flows and,
therefore, on the profitability of a lending contract. However, when we tried to employ this
procedure we encountered severe problems of data availability regarding the real cash flows
of completed credit contracts. For that reason it was impossible to use a purely cash-flow-
based approach. Therefore, we applied two alternative measures that serve as proxies for
the success in cash flow terms:Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 3
• The first measure (explained in more detail in section 2 below) is based on the idea that a
loan contract´s profit emerges from an interest rate premium over a rate that the funds
could have alternatively been invested at. Hence, it is a rough measure of the surplus the
bank could reap if there are no problems during the life of the credit contract.
• The second measure captures such potential problems by looking at the frequency by
which „disturbances“ (e.g., delay of principal and/or interest payments by the borrower,
technical default by the borrower or even insolvency etc.) occurred. Such disturbances
imply either a definitve loss of payments for the bank or additional costs due to
renegotiations, active involvement in the borrower´s firm policy and/or use of collateral
etc.). Thus, the higher the frequency of such disturbances the lower the profitability of a
credit contract.
Our paper is linked with the recent literature on relationship banking
1. It contributes to that
literature in several ways: Concerning the „surplus“-question it augments the existing
literature by studying a different sample of data stemming from German banks. We were
allowed to use confidential data contained in the respective bank´s credit evaluation files.
This enables the use of various measures (e.g., the bank´s rating of a borrower etc.) that are
somewhat different from (and more comprehensive as) traditional financial accounting
measures. Furthermore our study tries to incorporate aspects like „cross selling“ and
„intensity of competition“ as independent variables for the „surplus question“. Third, the
„disturbance“ question has up to now - according to our knowledge - not been pursued in
the relationship banking literature. We study this question by using methods of logistic
regression and incorporating not only data from financial statements but also from the
individual credit contracts. Furthermore the results of the logistic regression analysis may
additionally be used as a basis for classification purposes. Finally, combining the results of
our two regressions we are able to test several hypotheses regarding the use of credit
contract variables (i.e., collateral and bonding).
In our study we use the common data set for the CFS research project on „credit policy“.
The sample selection procedure as well as some descriptive statistics have been described in
Elsas et al. (1997). We refer to that paper for all basic information (sampling procedures,
descriptive statistics, etc.) regarding the data. The current paper concentrates on the use of
                                               
1 See for example Petersen/Rajan (1994), Berger/Udell (1995) and Blackwell/Winters (1997).Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 4
the raw data and contains additional data descriptions only when necessary for the specific
research questions at hand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the „surplus“
question. We first consider the independent variables and possible theoretical arguments
about the impact these variables should have on the interest rate premium. Then we present
the results of an OLS-regression and give some interpretations. Section 3 concentrates on
the „disturbance“ question. Again we first describe independent variables and conceptual
arguments regarding the respective consequences for the frequency of potential problems.
Then the results of a logistic regression are presented and interpreted. Finally we show how
these results could be used for classification of firms in „problem“ and „no-problem“
categories by explicitly considering possible relations between the two types of
misclassification costs. Section 4 contains a short summary of the findings and concludes
with some suggestions for future research.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 5
2. „Surplus“ question
In this chapter we study the effects of different determinants on the pricing of credits in
current account
2. The spread between the interest rate of the loan and the respective
(3-months) Frankfurt interbank offered rate (FIBOR) is chosen to be the dependent variable
of our OLS-regression
3. This interest rate premium (IRP) is regressed on firm and credit
variables as well as on additional control variables for possible industry, bank, and year
effects. In subsection 2.1 the independent variables used in our regression are presented in
detail.
2.1. Variables
2.1.1. Firm variables
To control for firm-specific characteristics a set of „firm variables“ was chosen. Since the
data set of the „CFS“-sample is based on direct access to the bank´s credit evaluation files
we especially had the unique opportunity to use the individual rating of a firm. This rating
variable is augmented by some „traditional“ financial variables usually employed to
characterize the financial condition of a firm.
Rating (RAT): The rating reflects the bank’s individual evaluation of the loan’s risk and
is essentially a compact and comprehensive measure of various quantitative and qualitative
factors (e.g., the quality of the management, the market position of the firm and its future
prospects etc.). Therefore, the rating should be expected to be a very important determinant
of the IRP. The different internal rating systems of the five banks participating in our project
do not allow a homogenous assessment of the quality of the borrowers in the entire data
                                               
2 We concentrate on the results for these types of credit because they allowed for a relatively straightforward
standardization of benchmark interest rates. However, the results for the sample of investment credits using
the margins documented in the respective credit contratcs (the comparability of which is somewhat
problematical due to different procedures of banks with respect to benchmark rates, cost assessment etc.) do
not qualitatively differ from those of credits in current account. Interested readers may obtain further
information from the authors upon request.
3 More precisely: The FIBOR-rate for a loan was computed by taking the monthly FIBOR-average for the
month that the credit was granted to the respective firm.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 6
record. Therefore we had to transform the individual rating systems into a uniform scheme.
4
The resulting classification scheme is shown in table 1:
Rating category Credit standing
1 very good
2 good, above average
3 average
4 below average
5 problematic borrower
6 loan in danger; loss of loan
   Table 1:   Transformed rating system
The rating is integrated in the OLS-regression by means of dummy variables. We
hypothesize: The higher the rating category the higher the IRP.
Equity ratio (ER): Theoretical models of capital structure
5 predict that the default
probability of firms with a low equity ratio
6 is - ceteris paribus - higher than the default
probability of firms with high a equity ratio. If this higher default probability is reflected in
the interest rate, we should expect a negative relation between the equity ratio and our
dependent variable.
Return on total assets (RT): The return on total assets variable (defined as the ratio of
the firm´s earnings to the balance sheet total) is a rough measure for the earning power and
the profitability of a firm and should therefore be positively related to the repayment
probability of a loan. It is hypothesized that the IRP of a loan decreases with higher returns
on total assets.
                                               
4 The rating systems of the five banks and the transformation mechanism are described in detail in Elsas et
al. (1997).
5 See, e.g., Kraus/Litzenberger (1973).
6 For purposes of this study the equity ratio was defined as the ratio of book value of equity to the balance
sheet total.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 7
Size: In previous empirical studies
7 firm size often proved to be a significant variable
with a negative impact on interest rates. To control for such possible size effects we include
Ln(sales) as a measure for firm size.
Because the rating basically incorporates various firm characteristics we do not include
more variables to describe the situation of a firm. This procedure seems also to be justified
by looking at the results of the prevailing studies mentioned above, where the sometimes
numerous factors employed to define the specific situation of a firm were largely
insignificant (except firm size)
8.
2.1.2. Credit variables
To characterize the credit environment the following credit variables are used:
Collateral (UNCOL) and Covenants (COV): Credit contracts often contain
requirements for the borrower to provide collateral and to comply with various covenants.
While other papers integrated collateral requirements by means of dummy variables
9 (e.g., 1
if collateral is pledged, 0 if the loan is unsecured), we had the opportunity to incorporate
collateral in a more detailed form due to the access to the banks´ credit files. We represent
collateral requirements by that proportion of the loan that is uncollateralized (UNCOL).
Regarding covenants we used a dummy (COV) to account for the existence of such
provisions (e.g., direct and/or indirect dividend constraints
10, etc.).
The hypotheses regarding the impact these variables on the IRP depend on the
theoretical framework. Using arguments stemming from combining agency- and signaling-
theory better firms can signal their true quality by offering more collateral and/or restrictions
(covenants) to bondholders
11. Better firms know that they will not severely suffer from
offering more collateral and/or covenants because of their relatively low probability for the
occurrence of situations where covenants are violated and/or the bank might use the
pledged assets. Thus, it pays for better firms to offer more collateral and/or covenants in
exchange for lower interest rates. According to this theory a negative relationship should
                                               
7 Petersen/Rajan (1994), Blackwell/Winters (1997).
8 This is especially true for the studies of Berger/Udell (1995) and Blackwell/Winters (1997).
9 This is the procedure employed in Berger/Udell (1995) and Blackwell/Winters (1997).
10 See for a conceptual analysis of the efficacy of such constraints John/Kalay (1982), Kalay (1982), Ewert
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hold between the amount of collateral and/or the existence of covenants and the IRP; that
amounts to a positive (negative) coefficient for UNCOL (COV).
A converse view is often advanced by practitioners and amounts to a „reverse signaling
argument“. According to that view banks only require collateral and/or covenants for
relatively risky firms.
12 If the firm is instead classified as having only low risk the bank
dispenses with collateral and/or covenants. Thus a positive relationship should hold between
the amount of collateral and/or the existence of covenants and the IRP, which implies a
negative (positive) coefficient for UNCOL (COV).
If instead pure financial contracting theory
13 is used the resulting impact is only clear for
the individual firm but not in a cross-sectional analysis. According to this theory lenders are
able to form rational and unbiased expectations regarding the firm´s future prospects. There
are firm-specific agency-problems that can be mitigated by the use of collateral and/or
covenants. Each firm chooses a specially designed credit contract that maximizes firm value
by trading off additional monitoring and bonding costs against reductions in interest rate
premiums. For a single firm the use of collateral and/or covenants should reduce credit
costs, which amounts to a negative relationship between these variables. However, in a
cross-section that relationship need not hold because usually the firms with the highest
degree of agency problems (which presumably are high risk firms) will find it most
advantageous to offer credit contracts including collateral and/or covenants. Thus, it may
well be that there is cross-sectionally a positive relationship between the observed IRP and
the use of collateral and/or covenants, depending on which of the two effects (reduction of
individual credit risks versus use of collateral and/or covenants by observably riskier firms)
is stronger.
Summarizing the above discussion, only the signaling and reverse-signaling hypotheses
yield clear implications for the sign of the coefficients of UNCOL and COV. In any case the
results of both regressions (i.e., „surplus“ and „disturbance“ question) have to be
considered in testing the respective theories, since the Logit-analysis for the „disturbance“-
question is a direct test of the relationship between several determining factors and the
                                                                                                                                             
11 See for different contexts of such explanations e.g. Bester (1985, 1987), Chan/Kanatas (1985),
John/Kalay (1985), Besanko/Thakor (1987) and Ewert (1988).
12 Some theoretical justification for this view is given by Bester (1994).
13 See, for example, Jensen/Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Smith/Warner (1979).Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 9
observed probability of problems. Thus, the Logit results may corroborate or contradict the
results of the premium-regression.
Cross selling (CS): As mentioned in the introduction, the lending business seems to be
often viewed just as a door opener for other transactions. To account for such aspects we
used a dummy variable that was coded 1 if cross selling arguments were explicitly found in
the bank´s loan files and 0 otherwise. We expect that the existence of cross selling
arguments should go along with a lower IRP.
Intensity of competition (HHI): In order to include the intensity of competition
between bank institutions in our regression analysis we use the so called „Hirschmann-
Herfindahl Index“ (HHI) with the modification of Riekeberg (1995). This index is designed
to measure the concentration of bank institutions in the area where the borrowing firm is
headquartered. The HHI-index is calculated as follows:
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NBOi refers to the number of branch offices bank i has in the respective regional bank
market. The first three digits of the German five-digit-postal-district-code-numbers were
used for the demarcation of the regional bank markets. The numbers of branch offices in
these markets were taken from the branch office statistic of the „Deutsche Bundesbank“. As
the HHI - index increases with decreasing intensity of competition (as measured above) we
should expect the coefficients of the HHI - index to have a positive sign.
House bank relationship (HB): The closeness of the relationship between the firm and
the bank is often designated as a very important factor for the pricing of loans
14. Most
former studies use the duration of the relation between the firm and the bank as a measure
for the closeness of that relationship. In our project we had the opportunity to directly
inspect the respective loan files and to ask the banks officials about their evaluation. To
account for possible house bank aspects we incorporate a dummy coded 1 if the bank itself
marked the relationship a house bank relationship and 0 otherwise
15. The usual hypothesis
                                               
14 Theoretical arguments can be found, for example, in Diamond (1989) and Diamond (1991).
15 See for a more detailed procedure concerning the housebank definition Elsas/Krahnen (1998).Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 10
is, that close relationships between banks and lenders are valuable and should lead to a
decrease in the IRP.
 Number of banks (NUM): On the one hand, the number of banks which a firm borrows
from can be viewed as a proxy for the closeness of the relationship between the bank and
the borrower. On the other hand, it can also be viewed as a measure for the quality of the
borrower. The lower the quality of a firm the more the firm has to seek for banks who agree
to give additional credits. Both arguments predict a positive relation between the number of
banks and the IRP.
16
Bank´s credit as a portion of the firm´s total capital (BCP): Another variable we
examine is the firm’s total available credit from the bank as a percentage of the firms total
assets (BCP). Two competing theories concerning this variable are possible. On the one
hand, this variable may be viewed as another proxy for the closeness of the relationship
between the bank and the borrower. According to this view, a high BCP means that the
relationship is relatively close
17 and one should observe a negative relation between the BCP
and the IRP. On the other hand, a high BCP also implies that the bank bears a higher risk of
the borrower´s investment program. Using this argument one should expect a positive
relation between the BCP and the IRP due to a greater risk premium. The net effect
resulting from both arguments is open.
2.1.3. Additional control variables
Industry dummies: Industry characteristics are included in our regression analysis because
they also can affect a loan´s risk. Different branches are reflected in dummy variables. We
differentiate between the manufacturing sector, the construction sector, the service sector,
the distribution sector, and other industry sectors
18.
Bank dummies: In order to identify whether banks use different proceedings in the
pricing of loans and/or whether the chosen variables have different influences in different
banks, we also include the five banks participating in our research project by dummy
variables.
                                               
16 Petersen/Rajan (1994) empirically document such an relationship.
17 See for a similar argument Blackwell/Winters (1997), p. 279.
18 Most of the firms in this category were in the food and beverage industry.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 11
Year dummies: The CFS-sample covers a time period of five years (1992-1996). Thus,
it also seems to be necessary to control for different years of lending. Among other things,
the significance of year dummy variables would suggest that the lending policy of banks was
also influenced by economy-wide factors.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 12
2.2 Results
Table 2: OLS-regression of the IRP for sample A (N = 299) and sample B (N = 141) of the CFS-data-set.
For the categorial dummies rating, bank, industry and year the basis is indicated respectively. With regard
to the rating, RAT1 and RAT2 have been grouped together. Following the discussion above the predicted
signs (if possible) of the coefficients for the firm- and credit-variables are given in parentheses.
Variables Sample A Sample B
   Intercept 4.483* 3.0858*
Firm variables (Rating dummies relative to RAT1,2)
    RAT3 (+) .1839 -.2729
    RAT4 (+) .1895 .1993
    RAT5 (+) .5168** .1635
    RAT6 (+) # .564
    ER (-) -.0043*** .005
    RT (-) .0007 .0086
    LNSALES (-) -.1503* -.1369***
Credit variables
    UNCOL (?) -.0041** -.007*
    COV (?) .2824** .0544
    CS (-) -.2126** .0099
    HHI (+) -1.8998* 2.6372*
    HB (-) -.1579 -.2545
    NUM (+) .1389 .0241
    BCP (?) -.4233 0.0086
Industry dummies (Relative to the manufactoring sector)
    Construction sector .2415 #
    Service sector .4818** -.1682
    Trade sector -0.0364 -.3643
    Other sectors -.1056 -1.1236*
Bank dummies (Relative to Bank 1)
    Bank 2 -.1479 .2202
    Bank 3 .3549** 1.1989*
    Bank 4 .0923 .3355
    Bank 5 .2124 -.0625
Year dummies (Relative to 1992) Sample A
(N = 299)
Sample B
(N = 141)
    1993 1.3854* 1.4711*
    1994 1.7266* 2.0623*
    1995 1.7764* 2.1897*
    1996 2.0041* 2.7309*
Adjusted R
2 .5667 .6552
F-statistic 16.6065* 11.6412*
* Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 10 percent level.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 13
# No case with this characteristic found.
The regression has good explanatory power according to the usual measures. In the sequel
the results are discussed for the respective groups of variables.
2.2.1 Firm variables
The results concerning the rating variables are somewhat surprising. Taking into account
that the rating essentially condenses plenty of information of various sources and origins,
one should expect strongly significant positive coefficients for all rating dummies increasing
in the rating number. The results, however, show that the rating variables are largely
insignificant except the coefficient for RAT5 in sample A. Moreover, the monotonicity
property is violated in sample B, and RAT3 in that sample even has a negative coefficient.
Hence, a systematic and significant relationship between the rating and the interest rate
premium - given all other variables - cannot be detected.
This result is not easy to explain, but some possible hypotheses can be given. First, one
could argue that there are other factors except the rating that influence the credit terms,
some of which are cross-selling, competition and similar aspects. We return to this point
later because these variables are explicitly incorporated in the regression. Second, the
results may be due to the fact that the analysis only contains credits on current account for
the entire sample period 1992-1996. Provided the bank does not terminate the lending
relationship with the firm, those credits are usually extended on a year-by-year basis. If the
terms of these credits are not continuously adjusted for possible changes of the respective
firm´s rating over time, the detection of significant relationships between the rating and the
IRP would be hampered. But even if this last interpretation should be true the question of
why banks behave that way remains still to be answered. Since we are currently not able to
answer that question we must leave it for future research.
With respect to the other firm variables, our regression illustrates a negative relationship
between the equity ratio ER and the interest rate in sample A. This predicted result is
statistically significant at the 10 percent probability level. For sample B, the respective
coefficient is insignificant and has the „wrong“ sign. The return on total assets RT is
generally insignificant and in the „wrong“ direction, while the size measure LNSALES is
significant (at different levels) in both samples
19.
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2.2.2 Credit variables
In both samples the coefficients for the collateral variable UNCOL are negative and
significant at least at the 5%-level. The coefficient for COV is positive in both samples but
only significant in sample A at the 5%-level. These results are not consistent with the
combined agency- and signaling arguments outlined in section 2.1.2 above. According to
this theory we should observe higher interest rate premiums for firms with lower collateral
and less covenants contradicting the results in table 2. On the other hand, if the converse
signaling-hypothesis holds then „good“ firms are not required to pledge much collateral and
to install covenants, and they should receive better credit terms, a view that is confirmed by
our regression. With respect to the pure contracting theory the empirical results are
consistent as far as it is hypothesized that the riskier firms find it more profitable to use
collateral and to install covenants, and that this effect cross-sectionally dominates the
individual interest-reducing effect of using such mechanisms. As was already mentioned
above, however, the premium-regression alone does not allow for a final judgment
regarding the three competing hypotheses. The Logit-results of section 3 have also to be
taken into account.
Regarding the variables for cross-selling CS and competition HHI, both variables are
significant in sample A while only HHI is significant in sample B. However, comparing the
sign of the coefficients for both samples is somewhat puzzling. The cross-selling variable
works in the expected direction only in sample A but not in sample B, while the competition
index HHI (generally significant at the 1%-level) has the expected sign only in sample B. In
explaining these findings one could argue that the CS-values can be attributed to the
characteristics of the two samples. In particular, the firms in sample B are firms that the
banks have marked as „firms with potential problems“
20. Provided that the prospects of
future transactions other than lending are lower for sample B-firms, cross-selling arguments
should indeed play no role for those firms which is consistent with the findings in table 2.
More difficult is, however, the explanation for the HHI-results. Extending the line of
reasoning for the CS-variable to the HHI-index one could argue that firms with potential
problems find it more difficult to obtain credit from other banks. Hence, an incumbent bank
can possibly better use its monopoly power in a certain region for sample B-firms. But this
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does not explain why the HHI-coefficient is negative in sample A. We suspect that this is at
least partly due to the construction of the HHI-index wherein regions according to zip-
codes play a great role. If competition would be more broadly defined (e.g., one could
argue that in the age of computer and communication the entire world is the „relevant“
market for financial transactions), the HHI-index is a too narrow measure of competition.
Thus, the findings with regard to the HHI-index should be interpreted with caution and just
be viewed as a first step.
Finally, in both samples all variables that can somehow be linked with housebank-
relationships (HB, NUM, BCP) are insignificant (although most of them have the predicted
sign). This is in contrast to the findings of other studies
21 where relationship variables often
proved to be significant explanatory variables. A direct comparison is, however, difficult
due to completely different data sets and varying variables.
2.2.3 Additional control variables and refinements
Relative to the manufacturing sector only firms of the service sector (other sectors) in
sample A (sample B) have significantly different interest rate premiums. The remaining
industry variables are not significant.
As can be seen in table 2 all year dummies are highly significant and strictly increasing in
time for both samples. This suggests that separate regressions for each year could possibly
yield additional insights into potential year-specific structures. However, running the
regressions for each year separately gives the following results of table 3 (The table only
includes sample A because sample B contains not enough cases for a meaningful
subdivision. The levels of significance are marked as in table 2):
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Variables 1992
(N=59)
1993
(N=58)
1994
(N=56)
1995
(N=64)
1996
(N=62)
Intercept 4.2402** 5.5102* 8.1398* 8.2052* 7.3523*
Firm variables
    RAT3 (+) .0896 .4164 .3533 .3037 .3765
    RAT4 (+) -.0176 .7341 .5003 .3766 -.087
    RAT5 (+) # .0156 .6896 .7745 .7278
    ER (-) .0003 .0013 -.0094 .0015 -.0098
    RT (-) .0001 .0063 .0081 .0011 .0011
    LNSALES (-) -.1727 -.1748*** -.3855** -.2501 -.175
Credit variables
    UNCOL (?) -.0029 -.0053 -.0059 -.008** -.0055
    COV (?) .4521 -.1241 -.2319 .6453** .3739
    CS (-) -.3055 -.2998 .4263 -.3108 -.3452
    HHI (+) -.824 -1.1053 .6276 -1.8548 -3.7395***
    HB (-) -.2073 .1588 .0327 -.2752 -.0968
    NUM (+) .0027 -.0182 .0055 -.0358*** -.0183
    BCP (?) -.2025 -1.0639 -.5199 -1.4922 -1.0524
Bank dummies
    Bank 2 .2375 .3033 -.1787 -.4969 -.1915
    Bank 3 .4802 .6307 .3093 .1104 .3027
    Bank 4 .1589 .3523 .1029 -.4214 .0267
    Bank 5 .0543 .6107 .1703 -.135 .2085
Industry dummies
    Construction -.0251 -.0712 .4258 .1184 .6179
    Service .4204 .3732 -.5407 -.1834 .3838
    Trade .023 -.1169 -.2511 -.2185 .4801
    Other -.2435 -.2393 .4135 -.1306 -.1906
Adjusted R
2 -.1773 .1035 .2749 .3608 -.0587
F-statistics .5633 1.3134 1.9927*** 2.6932* .8389
Table 3: OLS-regression results for IRP differentiated by year, Sample A
* Significant at the 1%-level
** Significant at the 5%-level
*** Significant at the 10%-level
# No case with this characteristic foundEwert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 17
In view of table 3 it seems difficult to detect any systematic relationships for the single
years. The regressions generally have relatively low explanatory power. According to the F-
statistic only the regressions for 1994 and 1995 are significant at all, and within each year
just a few variables (if any) are individually significant. This may partly be due to the low
number of cases for each year compared to the number of variables, an indicator of which is
the negative adjusted R
2 that is obtained for the two years 1992 and 1996.
22 In any case,
taking a more diffentiated view at the data by dividing the sample on a year-by-year basis
lets the results appear extremely heterogeneous. Only a few variables have a consistent sign
during all years. In the year with a relatively acceptable explanatory power (1995), the two
collateral variables UNCOL and COV are both significant and have the same signs as in
table 2. Furthermore, 1995 is the only year in which one of the relationship-banking
variables (NUM) gets significant, but unfortunately it has the „wrong“ sign.
With regard to the bank dummies table 2 reveals that there is indeed one bank (bank 3)
that is obviously able to consistently charge higher interest rate premiums than all other
banks in both sample groups. This raises the question of whether the parameters chosen for
our analysis affect the credit policy of different banks differently. In order to answer this
question we subdivided the credit sample by the five banks and run the regression separately
for each bank. The results are summarized in table 4 (The statistical significance is again
marked in accordance with table 2. For the same reasons as in table 3 the results of table 4
only cover the cases of sample A. Furthermore, the numbering of the five banks has been
changed relative to tables 2 and 3 to keep the banks from being detected):
                                               
22 This argument, however, is a very tentative one and cannot fully capture the variability of the statistical
results in table 3. For instance, subdividing the data by banks (which will be done in the text immediately)
and analoguously performing separate regressions with essentially the same number of variables yields
results of a very good explanatory power according to the usual measures.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 18
Variables Bank 1
(N=66)
Bank 2
(N=68)
Bank 3
(N=44)
Bank 4
(N=81)
Bank 5
(N=40)
Intercept 4.454* .0353 3.4465 7.6516* 5.1837***
Firm variables
    RAT3 (+) .0976 -.1103 1.3717 .1055 -.1075
    RAT4 (+) -.01125 .0602 .9128 .0268 -.9208
    RAT5 (+) -1.2365** .0689 # .1378 -.5646
    ER (-) -.0147* .0168 .0023 -.0192** .0203
    RT (-) .0052 -.0013 -.0126 -.0025 -.0028
    LNSALES (-) -.0583 .2001 -.1879 -.3911** -.1373
Credit variables
    UNCOL (?) -.0052 -.0103** -.004 -.0027 -.0052
    COV (?) .5156** -.266 -.3351 .4537** .4147
    CS (-) -.041 .4325 .013 -.3469 -.5518
    HHI (+) -.6394 -2.9723*** -.2632 -5.694** -4.6724
    HB (-) -.6609* 1.6887* -.0122 -.3941*** -.4485
    NUM (+) -.0447 -.0567*** -.0191 -.0102 -.0849
    BCP (?) -.6149** 2.8226*** -.7284 2.0508** -2.2498
Industry dummies
    Construction .2805 .5618 .7672 .8606*** #
    Service .0286 2.9549* # -.585 #
    Trade -.5377** 1.3437* 1.8894 .1531 -.4358
    Other -.2513 -1.5868* .3299 .8197** -1.4784
Year dummies
    1993 1.0883* 1.3603* 1.4409** 1.5619* 1.5625*
    1994 1.5108* 1.7154* 1.9858* 1.7773* 1.8317*
    1995 1.2945* 1.4732* 1.993* 2.0071* 2.1048*
    1996 1.6065* 1.8799* 1.641*5 2.2424* 2.2392*
Adjusted R
2 .7174 .6462 .4039 .6808 .6886
F-statistics 8.8558* 6.8269* 2.5337** 9.1246* 5.5398*
Table 4: OLS-regression results for IRP differentiated by banks, Sample A
* Significant at the 1%-level
** Significant at the 5%-level
*** Significant at the 10%-level
# No case with this characteristic foundEwert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 19
The results of table 4 confirm statements in the literature
23 that the lending business
seems to be governed by highly idiosyncratic elements. The set of significant variables and
their respective coefficents differ considerably between the five banks except for the year-
dummies: They consistently have positive signs. Furthermore there is some common factor
with regard to the rating-dummies in that almost all rating variables are insignificant
except RAT5 of bank 1, but its coefficient has the „wrong“ sign. Moreover, such
unpredicted signs appear relatively often within the rating dummies (in more than 40% of
the respective coefficients).
The high extent of idiosyncrasy can best be seen by looking at some remarkable aspects.
Compare, e.g., bank 2 and bank 4 with respect to the following selected firm- and credit-
variables (the selection criteria are different signs or/and different significance in the sense
that a certain variable is significant for one bank but not for the other bank):
Selected firm- and credit- variables Bank 2 Bank 4
ER (-) .0168 -.0192**
LNSALES (-) .2001 -.3911**
UNCOL (?) -.0103** -.0027
COV (?) -.266 .4537**
CS (-) .4325 -.3469
HB (-) 1.6887* -.3941***
NUM (+) -.0567*** -.0102
                           Table 5: Selected variables for bank 2 and bank 4
Table 5 shows that many variables seem to work in opposite directions in the two banks.
Especially remarkable is the coefficient for the relationship dummy HB, which is
significantly positive (negative) for bank 2 (bank 4). This implies that firms having a house
bank relationship with bank 2 are charged not only higher interest rate premiums than in
bank 4, but they are also charged higher interest rate premiums (ceteris paribus) than
without a house bank relationship at bank 2. Thus, the question arises as to why firms
would find it profitable to enter into a house bank relationship with bank 2 at all, because it
is hardly imaginable that firms do not realize these structures of credit terms over time. We
suggest that there must be other (qualitative) factors in lending relationships that are not
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fully captured by existing approaches. These factors finally translate into quantitative terms
because they obviously allow certain banks to charge higher interest rate premiums which
may constitute a basis for earning abnormal returns without having to suffer from
competitive pressures. The specific nature of these factors and their resistance against
competition remains up to now an open question that may be tackled by future research.
2.2.4 Summary of the results for the „surplus“-question
Summarizing the results for the premium-regressions we state that the findings differ
according to the perspective that the data are viewed with. Taking a global view on the data
some structures emerge for the individual samples according to table 2. If, however, a more
specific point of view is taken by subdividing the data by year or by banks, the picture
changes. The structures that seem to emerge from the global view do not carry over to the
individual years and/or the individual banks. But at least some regularities can be identified.
First, the rating of the banks is largely insignificant. Secondly, the year-dummies are
consistently significant in the global regression and in the individual bank analyses. Finally,
regarding the credit factors the collateral variable UNCOL has a consistently negative sign
in all global and individual regressions (although the coefficient is not always significant).Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 21
3. Determinants of distress-probabilities
3.1. Procedure and variables
In order to get some insights into the determinants of the frequency of potential
„disturbances“ we performed a Logit analysis. Our aim was to investigate, whether there is
any systematic relationship between factors available at the beginning of the sample period
(1992) and the occurence of problems hereafter. For that purpose we first classified the
entire sample of credit engagements (200 firms) into „distress-cases“ and „non-distress-
cases“
24. A credit engagement is called „distressed“ if - during the period 1993-1996 - at
least one of the following events occured:
• Initiation of formal insolvency proceedings,
• utilization of collateral by the bank,
• valuation adjustments of the bank´s claims,
• initiation or planning of restructuring activities by the bank and/or
• termination of the bank´s engagement.
These criteria comprise a broad spectrum of potential problems that may occur during a
credit engagement. Each criterion involves specific costs that lower the bank´s return from
lending to the respective firm. Note that the classification procedure does not rely on the
firm rating nor is it applied to the sample group „B“ only. Thus, „distress-cases“ as defined
here can basically occur even for a firm with the best 1992-rating in sample group „A“.
Applying these criteria to the entire sample we first obtained 47 distress-cases (coded „1“
for Logit purposes) and 153 non-distress-engagements (coded „0“). After excluding those
cases that were already distressed in 1992 a total of 31 distress-cases remained.
We then regressed this dependent Logit-variable on several factors from the year 1992.
By this means it can be seen whether data from the beginning of our sample period is
systematically related to the frequency of later „disturbances“ as defined above. Additionally
the results of the analysis may also serve as a kind of „distress-prediction“ model analogous
to numerous models for bankruptcy prediction that are based on either Multivariate
                                               
24 The analysis in this chapter concentrates on the complete credit engagement (i.e., the firm that is granted
credit by a bank) instead of looking at single credits. The reason is that potential „disturbances“ can hardly
be traced to any single credit but are regularly caused by the firm´s total debt and the investment program.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 22
Discriminant Analysis
25 or Logit approaches
26. We will return to this second point after
presenting our Logit results.
The set of independent variables from 1992 is principally based on the set of variables for
the premium-regressions in chapter 2 with some modifications. With respect to the firm
variables, we first include the rating as described in chapter 2 as a compound measure of
various aspects that are relevant for the firm´s risk-return-characteristics as evaluated by the
respective bank. Additionally we incorporate three financial ratios that are usually employed
in financial statement analyses as important measures for long-term financial risk. These are
the equity-ratio ER (already used in chapter 2), the cash-flow-ratio CF defined as
„cashflow/total debt“
27 and the coverage ratio for long term assets CLTA, which is given by
„(equity + long-term debt)/(long-term assets)“. For all three variables the same qualitative
hypothesis holds: The higher the respective ratio the lower the distress probability should
be. Finally to control for firm size LNSALES is included again.
With respect to the credit engagement variables we first incorporate UNCOL (the
percentage of the bank´s claims that are uncollateralized) and COV (the dummy variable for
the existence of covenants). As was already the case in chapter 2 the hypotheses regarding
the sign of the coefficients for these two variables depend on the respective theory.
According to combined agency- and signaling-arguments we should observe a negative
relationship between the amount of collateral and/or covenants and the distress probability,
which amounts to a positive (negative) sign for UNCOL (COV). Conversely, if the reverse-
signaling arguments are employed, the sign for UNCOL (COV) should be negative
(positive). Again, no clear-cut statement is possible for the pure contracting theory.
Regarding the credit engagement variables we further include the number of banks
NUM and the relationship lending variable HB. For reasons already explained in chapter 2
the hypothesized effect for the distress probability is positive for NUM and negative for HB.
Consistent with our assumption that total indebtedness is responsible for potential problems
we do not include the variable BCP. Moreover the bank competition measure HHI is not
used in the Logit model because we cannot see any reason why the competition between
                                               
25 See, for example, Altman (1968), Gebhardt (1980), Zavgren (1983) and Baetge/Huss/Niehaus (1988).
26 See, e.g., Ohlson (1980) and Anders (1997). A comparison of the models of Altman (1968) and Ohlson
(1980) with more recent data is contained in Begley/Ming/Watts (1996).
27 This is the reciprocal value of the so-called „dynamic leverage ratio“ which describes the number of years
that are needed to repay the total debt obligations by using the firm´s cash flows.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 23
banks (which may be important at the time the funds are raised by the firm) should have any
systematic relationship to the probability of later problems mentioned at the beginning of
this chapter.
To control for possible industry effects we include the industry dummies as described in
chapter 2. Dummys for individual years are not needed since our Logit analysis captures the
occurrence of problems during an entire period (1993-1996). Bank dummies are also not
incorporated; our selection procedure for the distress-cases (i.e., exclusion of all
engagements that were already distressed in 1992) combined with the limited number of
observations affects the five banks differently. Thus, including bank dummies would
probably bias the results.
Because we couldn´t obtain 1992-ratings for all engagements, the sample had to be
reduced further. It finally consisted of 30 distress-engagements and 122 non-distress-
engagements
28.
3.2. Description of the data
In order to get a first impression of the structure of the 1992 data, the following table
depicts the mean values for the independent variables differentiated for distress- and non-
distress-cases:
Distress-engagements Non-distress-engagements
RAT 3,8333* 2,9672*
ER 0,1662** 0,2309**
CF 0,2877* 0,5893*
CLTA 0,9016 1,1492
LNSALES 11,3602 11,6625
UNCOL 0,7415 0,7031
COV 0,0323 0,093
NUM 7,2745 5,9047
HB 0,2258 0,3798
Table 6: Mean values 1992, Logit Analysis
(*: Difference significant at the 1%-level)
(**: Difference significant at the 5%-level)
                                               
28 To alleviate problems of data availability with respect to the other 1992-variables, we substituted missing
values with the sample-mean values for the respective variable.Ewert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 24
As can be seen from table 6 the relation between the means is in the expected direction
for most variables (of course, with respect to UNCOL and COV the „expected“ direction
depends on the theory chosen), although significant deviations are obtained only for RAT,
ER and CF. With respect to the rating it may be interesting to look at the rating
distributions for the two groups of engagements:
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     Figure 1: Rating distribution 1992, non-distress-cases
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                    Figure 2, Rating distribution 1992, distress-casesEwert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 26
highly significant there are only three coefficients that are individually significant. As in the
premium-regressions of chapter 2 the firm size variable LNSALES has again a significant
influence: The probability of distress decreases with a greater firm size. Furthermore, the
collateral variable UNCOL is significantly related to the probability of distress in that a
higher percentage of uncollateralized credits leads to a higher incidence of problems in the
following years. Stated differently more collateral seems to be connected to a decrease in
the distress probability, an interpretation that is confirmed by looking at the coefficient for
the covenants dummy COV which is negative (and only marginally insignificant).
Thus, the Logit results for the monitoring and bonding variables contradict the „reverse
signaling hypothesis“. According to this hypothesis riskier firms are required to pledge
collateral and to install monitoring and bonding mechanisms, which should result in a
negative sign for UNCOL and a positive sign for COV. Conversely the Logit results
support the combined agency- and signaling theory, according to which better firms can
signal their true quality by offering more and/or tighter collateral and covenants
respectively. However, looking back at the results of the premium regressions, if the
combined agency- and signaling hypothesis holds we should observe a negative relationship
between the IRP and the use of collateral and/or covenants. Since this is not supported by
the premium regressions, the empirical results of both regressions do not completely
corroborate the combined agency- and signaling theory.
One possible interpretation of the sign of UNCOL and COV is that the monitoring and
bonding devices are really useful in reducing debt-related agency problems. Therefore, the
incidence of potential „disturbances“ should decrease the more colletaral and/or covenants
are used, and this is confirmed by the empirical results. At first glance this argument is
consistent with the pure contracting theory - but only because the predictions of that theory
are somewhat indetermined regarding the sign of the coefficients in a cross-section. A
corroboration of the above line of argument could be obtained if the premium regressions of
chapter 2 revealed negative relationships between UNCOL and/or COV and the IRP, but
this is not the case. Thus, if all empirical results of this paper are taken together, we get
interpretations that are partially consistent and inconsistent with either of the three
hypotheses, and at the current time one cannot give any clear-cut statement.
With respect to the rating variable all dummies are in the hypothesized direction (higher
ratings yield higher probabilities of distress) but only the dummy for the worst rating 5 isEwert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 27
significant. Hence a similar conclusion as in the premium-regressions emerges: The banks´
rating is - given all other variables of the above multivariate analysis - somewhat
surprisingly not as significant as one would normally expect, although it incorporates
various qualitative and quantitative sources of information about firms.
All other coefficients have the predicted sign, but they are individually insignificant.
Higher values for the three debt-related firm variables (ER, CF, CLTA) show a negative
relationship with the distress probability. The higher the number of lenders the higher the
probability of distress, and a relationship lending contract seems to be related to a lower
distress probability.
3.4. Distress „prediction“
Inserting the 1992 data for an individual firm into the Logit equation yields a firm-specific
probability of distress. The mean values for the distress-group (non-distress-group) are
0,4273 (0,1373), and the differences are significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the
Logit results are able to „separate“ the two groups of engagements. The data for the entire
sample result in a distribution of distress probabilities. Analogous to Ohlson (1980) one can
use this distribution to compute a „cutoff“-probability  $ p such that all firms with individual
probabilities higher (lower) than  $ p are classified as distress (non-distress). This information
can in turn be used by a bank in the credit decision process. Note that the individual rating
of the bank is only part of the information that is contained in the individual distress
probabilities. Furthermore, even though the procedure is analogous to the one employed in
traditional bankruptcy prediction models, there are differences to our analysis in so far as
the case of insolvency is just one criterion for „disturbances“ in our study.
The difficulty in determining the cutoff  $ p results from the different types of errors that a
classification may produce. A type I (II) error occurs if a really distressed (non-distressed)
firm is classified as non-distressed (distressed). The „optimal“ cutoff essentially depends on
the relative magnitudes of the costs of both errors. For instance, if the cost of a type I error
is much larger than the cost of a type II error, the cutoff  $ p should take on relatively low
values because then more firms are classified as distress-firms. The concrete empirical
magnitudes of the costs of both errors are not known, but in the context of bankruptcyEwert/Schenk: „Determinants of Bank Lending Performance“ 30
4. Summary
The possibilities to empirically identify structural relationships regarding the determinants of
bank lending performance obviously depend on the level of aggregation. The more
differentiated the analysis is performed the more heterogeneity emerges from the data (e.g.,
the same factors seem to work differently for different banks). Only factors related to
collateralization and the existence of covenants seem to be of a relatively basic importance.
However, explaining the results with respect to these two factors is a „puzzle“: On the one
hand, more collateral seems to be related to higher interest rate premiums. On the other
hand, more collateral is linked with lower distress-probabilities. Stated differently, the
results seem to suggest that credit contracts are priced lower where the risks are greater!
An explanation for that finding is still missing, and this could be a starting point for further
theoretical and empirical analyses. In addition we have indicated in the text several problems
that should be addressed by future research, e.g., the measurement of the degree of
competition and the question of why there seem to be „walls against competition“ that allow
at least some banks to consistently earn relatively high interest rate premiums.References
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